Helping ballast the global governance architecture

Australia relies on global governance to advance our international interests. Indeed, all states do—as imperfect and dysfunctional as it often is, it is our best and often only medium for dealing with global challenges.

If we look at the global governance architecture in a disaggregated way, it is easy to appreciate the security benefits we derive from its various institutions. Whether it is the UN, WHO, World Bank, WTO, or IMF; each have clearly helped to solve collective action problems across trade, finance, health, security, development, and the environment. When governance succeeds in making us safer and more prosperous, we are quick to realise the instrumental benefits.

What we appreciate less is the intrinsic value of the system as a whole. The architecture is important not only for the security outcomes it often brings about, but for the enduring fact that it enables us to cooperate at all. Indeed, we take for granted the significance of having an international table around which to gather in the first place; we did not always have one, and nor was it inevitable in a world of nation-states. But we are safer for the very fact that we do.

All this is to say, we should work with and through international institutions to advance our immediate interests. (There are many specific ways we plan to do so outlined elsewhere in the strategy.) But we should also appreciate that the shape and health of the system pre-conditions that very possibility. Thus, it would be short-sighted only to tune in when we stand immediately to gain, otherwise letting governance atrophy. Ultimately, it pays to make the system work. And that requires constant and patient investment.

In that vein, Australia will work to strengthen the architecture of global governance for its own sake. We will do so by:

Constantly showing up. Australia will work to maintain a consistently engaged presence in global governance efforts, even when matters of the day concern our interests distantly. Doing so is still important in at least two ways: first, it maintains our political capital in these forums, such that we can exert influence when governance issues do bear significantly on our interests; and second, it helps normalise that expectation and behaviour more broadly, in ways that deepen our social capital as a cooperative network.

Properly resourcing the governance architecture. To ensure the global governance architecture is sustainably equipped to facilitate cooperation and tackle major issues, Australia will work with international partners to step up voluntary contributions on a mutual basis, as needed. We will also look to increase secondments of Australian personnel across the wider global governance ecosystem.

Ensuring international institutions carry normative force. It is crucial that Australia remains a flag bearer of global governance and multilateralism—especially as the world experiences an inward retreat. The abandonment of multilateralism will otherwise have a self-fulfilling effect; the growing scepticism of its prospects will corrode its potential in reality. Australia can help counteract that, beyond just showing up. Specifically, we can ensure that we abide diligently by international laws and regulations—and pressure others to do the same. If we otherwise bend them to indulge conveniences, or allow others to, we will erode their normative force and encourage such disobedience in general. We would then bear the long-term costs of finding that the system, when really needed, had broken down as a means of cooperation or regulation.

Making it more inclusive and participatory. For global governance to be workable and legitimate over the long-term, all states need to have an inclusive stake and say in the system. That is why, in line with SDG 10.6, Australia will advocate for better representation of developing countries in the global governance architecture.

Ensuring the great powers are equitably represented. For similar reasons, we will push for a more equitable distribution of authority among the great powers in international institutions. The current architecture denies certain states their due status, in ways that undermine the system's legitimacy, buy-in, and potential for cooperation. Just as it was earlier necessary to recognise the PRC's status, so too must we now accommodate the geopolitical weight of Japan, Germany, and India. That is why we will advocate the expansion of UN Security Council permanent membership, ensuring it accords appropriate status to emerging and normalising great-powers.