Denying and deterring attacks against Australia

Australia's highest security concern will always be the nation's survival. And as much as we face multiple existential risks, not least climate change, war has long been the swiftest usher to exit from the state system.

Tragically, geostrategic frictions have revived the risk of war. The movement of history has revealed the relative peace of the post-Cold War years to have been a welcome respite, not a permanent condition. The expiry of the US' unipolar moment brings with it the return of competition, contestation, and potentially conflict. Worrisome flashpoints include the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and the Himalayan frontier.

While the prospect of an attack against Australia remains remote, the existential stakes demand that we prepare for the possibility.

Crucially, though, we must do so without intensifying the security dilemma of other resident states in the region. Too easily can the search for security spur reciprocal militarisation that leaves our position more precarious than it was in the first place. Australia must therefore enhance its military capabilities in such a way that credibly conveys our defensive intent.

Given these constraints, a strategy of deterrence-by-denial is most apt. That is, a strategy of assuring enemies we could exhaust a prospective attack, rendering it too costly a course to consider pursuing. Deterrence-by-punishment as the main alternative is simply not credible for a state of our size. We could not dissuade minor incursions, for instance, with threats of suicidal mass retaliation. Further, a punishment strategy is flawed in requiring devastating deep-strike capabilities that would collaterally threaten the populations of our near-neighbours.

For a denial strategy to succeed, however, Australia must move past old orthodoxies. We must conceive of the area to be denied in deeper and farther terms than the sea-air gap to Australia's north. Our adversaries' new long-range strike capabilities have dissolved that boundary as a meaningful line of defence. Going forward, we must be able both to hold potential adversaries further at bay, and neutralise threats that would strike closer to home.

To sharpen Australia's deterrence and denial capabilities, the strategy sets out the following acquisition priorities:

Maritime denial. To enhance our ability to deny access to Australia's extended maritime approaches, Australia will increase investment in long-range, anti-ship capabilities. We will significantly scale acquisition of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, pursuing its integration with the F-35A, and look to replace the Harpoons fielded by RAN vessels with the more advanced Naval Strike Missile. We will also support Army's adoption and deployment of coastal Precision Strike Missile batteries.

Missile defence. Just as Australia must enhance its long-range strike capabilities, so too must we better protect ourselves against them. Potential adversaries increasingly field long-range, conventional missiles that can target bases, cities, and other strategic sites on the Australian mainland. Our consequent vulnerability to a decisive first-strike is significant in two ways. First, it undermines the credibility of our deterrence, which relies on assuring a cost-imposing response. Second, our defencelessness against the threat makes us more susceptible to compellence—essentially, blackmail backed by the threat of force. Australia will therefore look to acquire road-mobile missile defence systems and interceptors that can equip our Aegis warships. Strengthening our missile defences in this way will help significantly blunt a prospective missile attack, denying its efficacy as a threatened or actual course of action against us.

Autonomous combat systems. As we look to bolster our maritime and air denial capabilities. Australia will aim to significantly scale deployment of the Loyal Wingman combat drone, alongside exploring large-scale acquisition of XLUUVs such as the Boeing Orca. These systems promise to unlock significant force multiplier effects that boost the presence, persistence, awareness, survivability, and lethality of the ADF in missions to deny access to Australia's extended approaches.

Mitigating capability gaps. Delays to the Future Frigate and Future Submarine Programs limit Australia's capacity over the next decade to engage effectively in underwater and surface warfare, intelligence-gathering, and fleet escort operations. As a matter of urgency, we will take all necessary measures to extend the service life of the Collins and Anzac classes. We will modernise their systems, sensors, and armaments as needed to ensure that they can continue to fulfil critical submarine and surface missions until the arrival of the Hunter-class and new AUKUS submarines. An initial priority will be to explore equipping the Anzacs with the second 8-cell VLS for which they are fitted. We will also assess the benefits and feasibility of rapidly acquiring an additional Hobart-class destroyer, fitted with a more multirole mission module, in substitute of one of the nine planned Hunter-class frigates.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance. Long-range, modern threats require that we hold adversaries further at bay, in turn demanding more far-reaching ISTAR capabilities. Australia will therefore look to extend its theatre awareness via a sovereign geospatial satellite capability and upgrades to the Jindalee Operational Radar Network. We will also consider exercising the option for a seventh E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft. These actions will complement existing efforts to build up the ADF's ISTAR capacity, such as Army's planned introduction of the Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS) and the RAAF's coming deployment of maritime surveillance UAVs.

Survivable logistics. The effectiveness of our defence force hinges on having adequate logistic enablers. If we cannot sustain ranged operations, we will lack the reach and resilience needed to assure credible deterrence. A current weakness in this regard is the limited range of our F35s. The lacking stealth of Australia's aerial refuelers compounds the issue, as they cannot safely support the F35s in high-threat environments. To overcome this limitation, Australia will aim to acquire a stealthy, unmanned aerial refuelling capability, along the lines of the US Navy's MQ-25 Stingray.