Standing up for the rules-based order

We must always aim for self-reliance in protecting Australia's sovereignty. We know that requires a ready and capable defence force.

Still, our defence force can never guarantee our sovereignty absolutely. Australia is inherently vulnerable in a world populated by greater powers. In our lesser strength, there is only so much our military can do to mitigate that risk.

Yet if small states are vulnerable in general, we would be especially so in a world of anarchy. Then the law of the jungle would reign; Australia would be legitimate prey.

But we do not live in anarchy—at least no longer. Through successive post-war treaties, laws, and institutions, we instead built a rules-based order. We became an international society, bound by commitments to the non-use of force.

It is, of course, an imperfect system—as the horror in Ukraine shows. That is why we will always need insurance in the form of a robust defence force. Nevertheless, in the long view, history tells us that the rules-based order has relegated interstate war as the exception, not the rule.

The implication is that our defence force is only part of the equation when it comes to preserving our territorial sovereignty. Just as important are the international norms and rules, brittle as they are, that put constraints on force in the first place. We can be sure that Australia has had less need to deter or resist aggression because of this architecture.

Upholding the rules-based security order must therefore be part of our defence strategy overall. In particular, we should work to defend three pillars of the system from which we derive the most security:

The UN Charter. The Charter is vital in legally protecting our sovereignty against aggression. We must ensure it continues to carry normative force, and take firm action alongside partners to condemn and sanction breaches of states' rights under the Charter. In that last respect, nothing is more urgent than ensuring, through sanctions and military aid, that Russia's invasion of Ukraine fails totally. Every state will suffer if a successful invasion inspires or normalises such violations. That is why—in this and all cases like it—we have an interest in lending our weight to strong international responses in defence of the UN Charter.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Much like the UN Charter, UNCLOS is critical as the legal basis for our maritime territorial rights. It guarantees our exclusive access to Australia's vast oceanic resources, as well as our rights to transit freely through international waters. Our interests in defending UNCLOS—near and far—bear a similar logic to the above: when norms are trampled anywhere, they are threatened everywhere. The failure to uphold norms in one situation will soon embolden their disregard more broadly. For that reason, we should be resolute in defending other states' rights under UNCLOS, even if it appears beyond our immediate concern. Ultimately, we have an abiding interest in seeing the system upheld, as our own maritime interests are secured within its framework.

The Antarctic Treaty System. The ATS is one of the least appreciated bedrocks of international security. For decades, the treaty system has ensured that the vast continent to our south—42% of which we lay claim to—has remained free of military activities. To that extent, it has helped to contain competition and provide ballast to global stability in general. More than that, though, the ATS anchors our national security specifically. For one, it has relieved us of the need to secure our Antarctic territory directly. (This is significant because our Antarctic territory, in practice, is beyond our capacity to defend.) Further, the ATS has meant that Australia has not had to worry about direct threats emanating from our southern flank. By precluding the establishment of foreign military bases that could project force against Australia's main islands, we have been able to focus on defending our northern approaches. For these reasons, then, it is crucial that Australia remains vigilant in defending the ATS, particularly as certain Protocols become modifiable in 2048. Given we have little power to enforce the status quo, we must make every effort to maintain it legally.